January 2001, Manchester Crown Court
1. I intend to adopt arguments put by Mr Munyard concerning
1a Mens rea.
1b The lawful excuse of protection of property.
1c The lawful excuse of protection of human life and limb.
1d The common law defence of necessity.
1e The common law defence of duress of circumstances.
1f The Nuremburg principles as being part of international humanitarian law.
1g Customary international law being part of the common law of England.
1h International humanitarian law being customary international law binding on all states.
1i Any use of force being unlawful in customary international law (irrespective of the nature of the force) if made for reasons contrary to the charter or purpose of the United Nations.
1j Any use of force being unlawful in customary international law (irrespective of the nature of the force) if made for reasons contrary to the Nuremburg principles.
1k Any use of force being unlawful in customary international law (irrespective of the reasons for such use) if the effects include civilian casualties which are excessive considering the genuine military advantage to be gained.
1l Any use of force being unlawful in customary international law (irrespective of the reasons for such use) if the effects include unnecessary suffering to combatants.
1m Any use of force being unlawful in customary international law if it would have a seriously detrimental effect on neutral states.
1n Any threat of force being unlawful in customary international law if the act so threatened would be unlawful.
I shall speak of 1i and 1j together as crimes against peace, and 1l and 1m together are known as warcrimes.
For the avoidance of further misunderstanding, I would like to make the court aware that if any of the above are not put by Mr Munyard I shall be asking for further time in which to prepare the arguments myself.
2. I allege the common law crime of public nuisance, and submit that there is sufficient evidence for this to be put to the jury. Note that a threat of danger is sufficient to create a public nuisance, R v Soul (1980) 70 CrAppRep 295.
3. (abandoned).
4. I shall ask the court to consider the following alleged international law offences (ailos) which I submit as a matter of fact were being committed at the time of my alleged offence and which I submit are ongoing:
ailo1: a threat of force as in 1i and 1n supra.
ailo2: a threat of force as in 1j and 1n supra.
ailo3: a threat of force as in 1k and 1n supra.
ailo4: a threat of force as in 1l and 1n supra.
ailo5: a threat of force as in 1m and 1n supra.
5. I ask the court to consider the following which I submit would be committed if (heaven forfend) a weapon were used having effects which (as a matter of fact) breached 1k:
ailo6: a grave offence under the Geneva protocol 1977.
ailo7: a breach of the Nuremburg Principles, namely a warcrime.
6. I ask the court to consider the following which I submit would be committed if (heaven forfend) a weapon were used having effects which (as a matter of fact) breached 1l:
ailo8: a grave offence under the Geneva protocol 1977.
ailo9: a breach of the Nuremburg Principles, namely a warcrime.
7. I ask the court to consider the following which I submit would be committed if (heaven forfend) a weapon were used having effects which (as a matter of fact) breached 1m:
ailo10: a grave offence under the Geneva protocol 1977.
ailo11: a breach of the Nuremburg Principles, namely a warcrime.
6. I ask the court to consider the following which I submit would be committed if (heaven forfend) a weapon were used before war were declared.
ailo12: a breach of the Nuremburg Principles, namely a crime against peace.
7. I ask the court to consider the following which I also submit would be committed if a nuclear weapon were detonated anywhere in the atmosphere or on the ground.
ailo13: a contravention of article 1 of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
[The parties undertake] “to prohibit, prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere.”
I ask the court to rule as to whether this would be a crime against peace (as being the waging of war in contravention of treaty contrary to Nuremburg principle 6a(i) “.a war in violation of international treaties agreements or assurances”, or a crime under international law not being a breach of the Nuremburg principles, or a delict under international law.
8. I ask the court to consider the following which I also submit would be committed if a nuclear weapon were detonated anywhere in the atmosphere or on the ground.
ailo13: a contravention of 1925 Geneva Protocol whose preamble includes the words “Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or noxious gases and of all analogous liquids materials or devices has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world.”
I ask the court to rule that this is a crime against customary international law, the words in the preamble being declaratory of a state of international law already attained at that time. Failing that I ask the court to rule whether this has created any other crime or delict under international law.
9. I ask the court to consider the following which I also submit would be committed if a nuclear weapon were detonated anywhere in the atmosphere or on the ground.
ailo14: a contravention of article 30 of the charter of economic duties and rights of states 1974, “All states have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
I ask the court to rule as to whether this would be a crime against peace (as being the waging of war in contravention of treaty contrary to Nuremburg principle 6a(i)” a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances”, or a crime under international law not being a breach of the Nuremburg principles, or a delict under international law.
10. I ask the court to consider the following which I also submit would be committed if a nuclear weapon were detonated anywhere in the atmosphere or on the ground.
ailo15: a contravention of the Hague convention 1907 that regulates bombardment by naval forces. I ask the court to rule as to whether this would be a crime against peace (as being the waging of war in contravention of treaty contrary to Nuremburg principle 6a(i) “.a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances”, or a crime under international law not being a breach of the Nuremburg principles, or a delict under international law.
11. I ask the court to note that grave breaches of the Geneva protocol 1977 are statutory offences under the Geneva Convention (amendment) Act 1995, and that offences against customary international law are regarded as offences under the common law of England. With this in mind I ask the court to rule as to which of the ailos 1 to 15 inclusive are offences triable in England and Wales.
12. I allege conspiracy to follow a course of action that amounts to or would necessarily involve the commission of each and all of the ailos that are offences triable in England and Wales, contrary to s1 of the criminal law act 1967.
13. In respect of the offences that are ruled not to be triable in England and Wales and where such offences are not necessarily accompanied by an offence that is so triable, I allege both
A conspiracy to Corrupt Public Morals; and
A conspiracy to Outrage Public Decency.
Both these offences are usually brought in connection with sexual matters (and especially homosexuality). I submit that in these more enlightened times public decency may equally well be outraged by barbarity as by minority sexual tastes; given that this may be the case it is a matter.
For the jury to determine whether it is in fact the case. I make a similar submission with respect to public morals.
In addition, I submit that if the jury finds that the dictates of the international public conscience forbid effects tolerated by the English public conscience, they should consider whether this disparity is as the result of the conspiracy having already been successful in corrupting public morals.
I submit that these conspiracy charges, being brought under the common law of conspiracy which applied equally to crime and to tort, may properly be applied to crimes and/or delicts under international law so long as such crimes and/or delicts are not triable as offences in England and Wales.
14. Constitutional effects of nuclear war.
A nuclear war would have a huge de facto effect on the British Constitution.
The next four sections deal with the effects on, respectively, the Sovereignty of Parliament, the Crown, the Judiciary, and the Established Church.
15. Parliamentary control would be lost for an indeterminate period following a medium scale nuclear exchange; and permanently in the case of a full scale exchange. This represents the de facto termination of the Sovereignty of Parliament.
In my suggestion to follow a policy that may lead to such a result could only be constitutional with the express will of the Queen in Parliament. This has never been sought. In my submission such a course therefore cannot be persued under the royal prerogative. Her Majesty’s advisors have therefore acted ultra vires and are not covered by crown immunity.
16. The Monarch.
Her Majesty would lose de facto enjoyment of all her rights under the constitution: of her subjects both at home and abroad, of all the lands of her United Kingdom and all her dominions beyond the seas, and her relationship with the peoples and lands of her Commonwealth. In my submission she has not merely been advised badly, but recklessly so. Inasmuch as this recklessness is culpable it may constitute treason, and inasmuch as it affects the safety of the person of Her Majesty it may amount to High Treason; or at least so I submit.
17. The Judiciary.
The House of Lords, and all the seats of the various courts, including the Crown court, would be most likely lost in a full-scale holocaust. More importantly, so would most of my Lords Her Majesty’s Judges. Not so much an injustice as the end to justice, and indeed the ultimate contempt of court. Following Judge Weeramantry in his dissenting opinion to the ICJ I submit that no judicial system can declare just a set of laws that lead inevitably to its own demise. Borrowing from HLA Hart, Judge Weeramantry declares such law to be no more than the rules of a suicide club.
18. The Church of England.
Established, with the same Crown at its head as the Crown that orders the nuclear preparations, would also be devastated. The church buildings, livings, and incumbents would all equally be destroyed, and with means that go far beyond that church’s own ideas of just war. The crown being indivisible, a corporation sole, again it does not seem to me possible that anyone taking such action on the Crown’s behalf can be anything other than ultra vires, and therefore in a legal sense not acting on behalf of the crown and not really acting in accordance with their office. Or so I submit.
19. I allege conspiracy to commit crimes beyond the United Kingdom, namely all and each of the ailos 1 to 15 as may be offences in any part of the world other than the United Kingdom, contrary to section 1A of the Criminal Law Act 1967 as inserted by the Criminal Justice (Terrorist and Conspiracy) Act 1998 Subsection 1A(14)b makes immune “any person acting on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown”. Following R v Duguid (1906) 70 JP 294 CCR, an accused can be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offence even if some or all of the other conspirators might be immune. The circumstances of that case were that a man was convicted of conspiring with the mother of a child to commit an abduction, of which charge the mother might have been immune. I submit that any or all of the following are not acting on behalf of the Crown, nor holding office thereunder:
19a US Forces personnel conspiring with Trident personnel when visiting the UK.
19b US civilian persons conspiring with Trident personnel when visiting the UK.
19c Employees and subcontractors of VSEL, who are therefore working on behalf of VSEL or on their own account.
19d Persons apparently holding such office or working on such behalf but for the circumstances listed in 15, 16, or 18 supra. If there is any one person in any one category 19a to 19d then there is a offence in English law, notwithstanding that there possible may be many others still covered by immunity.
20. In respect of each of the offences against English law I seek the defence afforded by statute, namely that the acts intended in our agreement were intended to prevent such crime.